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RECENT CASES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-MOTION PICTURE EXHIBITOR HELD
To HAv No AEBS0LUT ImmUNITY FROM PRIOR CENSORSHIP
A Chicago ordinance requires a permit for the public showing of any
1
film and submission of the film to the police commissioner for examination
2
or censorship before a permit may issue. Upon petitioner-film distributor's refusal to submit a film for examination, the commissioner withheld
the necessary permit. On appeal to the mayor, this denial was made final on
the sole ground of petitioner's failure to submit the film. Petitioner then
sued in a federal district court to compel the issuance of a permit on the
theory that the submission requirement was an unconstitutional restraint on

free speech.

The district court's dismissal on the ground, inter alia, that no

4
3
On
justiciable controversy existed was affirmed by the court of appeals.
that
peticertiorari the Supreme Court also affirmed, five to four, holding
tioner had raised a justiciable issue as to the existence of an absolute right

to show a film without prior submission to an examiner, but that petitioner's
assertion of such a right was not constitutionally sustainable. Times Film
Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961).
The Supreme Court first dealt with the issue of prior censorship 5
6
in Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, which held unconstitutional a statute
under which publication of a newspaper had been enjoined following nine
malicious and defamatory editions. Chief Justice Hughes, for the majority,
emphasized that "liberty of the press . . . has meant, principally, al-

though not exclusively, immunity from previous restraints or censorship
7

Near did not foreclose the possibility that some previous re-

1 CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 155-4 (1931). The challenged portion of the
ordinance provides that "such permit shall be granted only after the motion picture
film for which said permit is requested has been produced at the office of the commissioner of police for examination or censorship."
2 The commissioner may refuse to issue a permit if the picture is immoral or
obscene, portrays unfavorably certain classes of citizens, tends to produce a breach
of the peace, or represents any hanging, lynching, or burning of a human being. Ibid.
The state's power to deny a permit on the ground of obscenity was sustained by the
Illinois Supreme Court in American Civil Liberties Union v. City of Chicago, 3
111.
2d 334, 121 N.E.2d 585 (1954).
a Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 180 F. Supp. 843 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 272
F.2d 90 (7th Cir. 1959), af'd, 365 U.S. 43 (1961).
4 Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 272 F.2d 90 (7th Cir. 1959), aff'd, 365
U.S. 43 (1961).
5 The classical statement is that "the liberty of the press . . . consists in laying
no previous restraints upon publications, and not in freedom from censure for criminal
matter when published." 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *151-52.
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925), had
6283 U.S. 697 (1931).
earlier established the application to the states, through the fourteenth amendment,
of the first amendment protection of free speech.
7283 U.S. at 716.
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straints might be sustained,8 but it did indicate that such restraints would
be constitutional only under exceptional circumstances. 9 The principles
announced in Near were approved and adopted in Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v.
Wilson,"° the first case to reach the issue of prior restraint upon the display
of motion pictures. This case not only decided that motion pictures are a
protected form of "speech," 11 but recognized that a state must bear a heavy
burden to justify any form of previous restraint upon them.12 The narrow
holding of Burstyn, however, was only that a film may not be banned on
the determination of a censor that it falls within the proscription of the
vague term "sacrilegious." 1 The Court expressly left open the question of
whether a "clearly drawn statute designed and applied to prevent the showing of obscene films" would be sustained. 14
8 "[T]he protection even as to previous restraint is not absolutely unlimited.
But the limitation has been recognized only in exceptional cases: 'When a nation is
at war many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its
effort . . . that no Court could regard them as protected by any constitutional
right' . . . On similar grounds, the primary requirements of decency may be
enforced against obscene publications. The security of community life may be protected against incitements to acts of violence and the overthrow by force of orderly
government" Ibid. Although the first amendment commands that "Congress shall
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech or of the press," the Supreme
Court has never extended an absolute protection to any medium of expression. E.g.,
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357
(1927) ; Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). Further, the Court has
withheld constitutional protection entirely from certain kinds of communication.
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (obscenity); Beauharnais v. Illinois,
343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952) (libel); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,
571-72 (1942) (fighting words).
9 Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).
10 343 U.S. 495, 503-04 (1952).
1 Id. at 502. Burstyn specifically repudiated the holding in Mutual Film Corp.
v. Industrial Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230, 244 (1915), that "the exhibition of moving
pictures is a business pure and simple, originated and conducted for profit, like other
spectacles, not to be regarded . . . as part of the press of the country or as organs
[sic] of public opinion."
12 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 504 (1952).
'3

Id. at 504-06.

14Id. at 505-06. Subsequent movie censorship cases have also involved the
application of particular statutory standards to individual films and have uniformly
held the statutes unconstitutional as so applied. Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v.
Regents of the University, 360 U.S. 684 (1959); Holmby Prods., Inc. v. Vaughn,
350 U.S. 870 (1955) (per curiam) (semble); Superior Films, Inc. v. Department
of Educ., 346 U.S. 587 (1954) (per curiam) (semble) ; Gelling v. Texas, 343 U.S.
960 (1952) (per curiam) (semble). But cf. Superior Films, Inc. v. Department of
Educ., s upra at 588 (concurring opinion). In earlier cases, the Court has struck
down prior restraints upon most media of communication. E.g., Winters v. New
York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948) (magazines); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296
(1940) (religious solicitation); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938)
(pamphlets and handbills); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931)
(newspapers); see Dumont Laboratories v. Carroll, 184 F.2d 153 (3rd Cir. 1950),
cert. denied, 340 U.S. 929 (1951) (television). But see Poulos v. New Hampshire,
345 U.S. 395 (1953) (religious meetings in public parks); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S.
77 (1949) (sound trucks) ; Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (religious
street demonstrations). These cases suggest that the Court, in dealing with state regulations in the interest of public safety and welfare, has been more tolerant of restrictions as to the time, place, or manner of dissemination of speech than of prior controll
over its content. See Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 282-83 (1951)
(concurring opinion). However, the question reserved in Burstyn and the result of the
instant case weaken that suggestion.
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The precise holding of the present case is elusive. There is a palpable
disparity between its scope as articulated by the majority and the broader
latent implications which the dissenters discern. 15 The majority purported
to limit its holding to a resolution of the narrow issue framed by the petitioner: "whether the ambit of constitutional protection includes complete
and absolute freedom to exhibit, at least once, any and every kind of motion
picture." 16 The issue was resolved by rejecting the major premise of
petitioner's argument, without suggesting any alternative premises on which
an attack could properly be grounded: since petitioner claimed an unqualified right to display its film, whereas the Near exceptions clearly do justify
some previous restraints, petitioner's constitutional attack on the ordinance
must fail. The dissenters, while recognizing that Near permits certain
prior restraints, 17 declared that by necessary implication the majority's
holding allows Chicago's blanket censorship scheme to stand as constitutional.' 8 For now, any film distributor finding himself in petitioner's situation must either submit his film for examination, in which case he will be
able to raise only quite different constitutional issues from those involved
in the instant case, 19 or run the risk of having his challenge to the submission provision of the ordinance thrown out of court on the authority of
the instant case.20 Unless an attack upon this provision on vagueness or
other grounds 2 1 can succeed without submission of a film, the effective
holding of the case is actually to declare the provision constitutional, or,
equally decisive, unassailable. It is unlikely that the majority intended its
decision to have such a sweeping effect.2 2 But since the ordinary process
of constitutional litigation 23 raises little probability that the Court will
soon be offered a chance to clarify the limits of its holding, the dangers of
misunderstanding inherent in the opinion's abrupt analysis might have
counselled a different handling of the case.
15 Compare majority opinion, instant case at 46-47, with dissenting opinion of
Chief Justice Warren, instant case at 54-55.
16 Instant case at 46. Compare notes 25-28 infra and accompanying text.
7
3 Dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Warren, instant case at 53.
.8Id. at 73.
10 Instant case at 46. Compare dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Warren,
instant case at 73-75.
2
0 There is language in the majority opinion which would support the conclusion
that no other "broadside" attack upon the Chicago ordinance is possible: "As to
what may be decided when a concrete case involving a specific standard provided
by this ordinance is presented, we intimate no opinion. The petitioner has not
challenged all--or for that matter any-of the ordinance's standards. Naturally we
could not say that every one of the standards, including those which Illinois' highest
court has found sufficient, is so vague on its face that the entire ordinance is void."
Instant case at 50.
21 See instant case at 46. See generally Note, The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine
in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67, 96-104 (1960). For another possible
ground of attack see text accompanying note 28 infra.
22 "Chicago's ordinance requiring the submission of films prior to their public
exhibition is not, on the grounds set forth, void on its face." Instant case at 46.
(Emphasis added.)
"At this time we say no more than this-we are dealing only
with motion pictures and even as to them, only in the context of the broadside attack
presented on this record." Id. at 50.
23 See dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Warren, instant case at 73-74.
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If the purpose of the majority opinion was merely to articulate a generally conceded gloss on the dictum in Near, the undertaling seems superfluous-especially in light of the importance which any decision in the
sensitive area of censorship necessarily assumes. On the seemingly innocuous premise that a state may prohibit by prior restraint some exceptionally harmful motion pictures, the Court may well have raised a precedent
for permitting states to impose comprehensive and burdensome licensing
systems on all motion pictures in order to reach those exceptional ones
which the state is constitutionally permitted to suppress.2 4 So far-reaching
were the constitutional implications of the instant decision that, instead
of simply mouthing the Near dictum,2 5 the majority should have reformulated the decisive issue 26 so as to permit a more penetrating examination
of the concrete problems inherent in delineating first and fourteenth amendment rights,27 thereby rendering the decisional process in the instant case
accordant with the salutary principle, frequently enunciated in opinions in
this area, that "though the goverumental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle funda-8
mental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved." 2
Fixing upon such a standard, the majority would have had its attention
directed to some of the vexing issues raised by the Chicago ordinance: the
existence of alternative methods for achieving the state's legitimate purpose,29 the adequacy of procedural safeguards afforded to film exhibitors by
24 The potential danger of the instant case lies in its ambiguity. The case arose
as a challenge to the Chicago ordinance, and some language of the majority opinion
purports to deal with the validity of that ordinance. Actually, however, the court's
holding is addressed to the purely abstract question of an individual's rights under
the first and fourteenth amendments. When the Court concludes that the Chicago
ordinance "is not, on the grounds set forth, void on its face," it is really saying that
in view of its abstract holding no statute could be found void on the grounds set
forth by the petitioner. By applying its abstract constitutional holding to a specific
statute, the Court calls attention to the misleading fact that it sustained the statute
in the face of a constitutional attack. The majority, perhaps sensing a need to justify
the broader implications of its narrow holding, said that the Supreme Court should
not limit a state's selection of an effective statutory program unless there is a
specific "showing of unreasonable strictures on individual liberty resulting from its
application in particular circumstances." Instant case at 50. Petitioner's presentation of its case did not include such a showing of injury to itself. But, as the dissent
pointed out, unreasonable interference with the liberty of real individuals inheres in
the very system established by the Chicago ordinance.
25 If the Court did not feel ready to discuss the constitutional problems involved
-beyond a repetition of the Near dictum-it would seem that denial of certiorari
have been a better disposition of the case.
would
26
Indeed, petitioner did argue that before a state may require submission of a
film for examination, it must have reasonable grounds for believing that the film will
transgress some valid standard for suppression. See Petition for Rehearing, pp. 2-4,
instant case. This went beyond the mere claim of an abstract right and constituted
an attack upon the face of the statute. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) ;
Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960). See also dissenting opinion of Chief Justice
Warren, instant case at 54-55.
27 Cf. Henkin, Some Reflections on Current Constitiutional Controversy, 109 U.
PA. L. REv. 479, 488-90 (1961).
28 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960). See also Kingsley Books, Inc. v.
Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 441 (1957); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495,
504 (1952).
29 Shelton v. Tucker, supra note 28, at 288-90.
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the program under attack, 0 and the differences between films and other
media which might affect the means that can legitimately be undertaken to
limit the dissemination of offensive and constitutionally unprotected material.3 1 Without these broader considerations, the opinion remains a
deceptively imposing and potentially dangerous monument to an unimportant principle.

ELECTIONS-CivILnIr EMPLOYEE OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
LIViNG ON MiLITARY RESERVATION Is RESIDENT OF STATE FOR
PUIPOSE OF VOTING REGISTRATION

Petitioner, a civilian employee of the federal government, lived on the
military reservation where he worked; he had not established any other
residence within the United States. Upon refusal of the county voting
registrar to enroll him, an original action for mandamus was brought in
the state supreme court. The court granted the writ, basing its decision on
the state legislature's repeal of a statute which denied voting residence to
persons living on Indian or military reservations.' Although implying
that the legislature had the power to extend the franchise to residents of
reservations where the federal government maintains exclusive jurisdiction,
the court premised its holding upon a determination that the federal government did not, in this case, exercise such exclusive jurisdiction since it had
retroceded to the state jurisdiction to levy taxes, administer schools, and
carry out certain other state functions within the reservation.2 Rothfels
v. Southworth, 356 P.2d 612 (Utah 1960).
Early decisions held uniformly that acquisition by the federal government of exclusive jurisdiction over land within state boundaries extinguishes both the duties and the privileges of state citizenship, including the
right to vote.3 The Supreme Court of Ohio went so far as to strike down
a reservation of the franchise for residents of land over which otherwise
30 See Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 440-44 (1957). See generally
Note, supra note 21, at 94.
31 See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502-03 (1952).
'Utah Laws 1896, ch. 126, § 11(11), was repealed by Utah Laws 1957, ch. 38, § 1.
2 The court mentioned, but did not decide, the alternative ground that-whatever
the legal status of residents of those portions of the military reservation acquired by
the federal government in such a manner as to create exclusive federal jurisdictionthe portion of the reservation on which petitioner resided was formerly part of the
public domain and hence had never been withdrawn from state jurisdiction. Rothfels
v. Southworth, 356 P.2d 612, 615 (Utah 1960). See Complaint, pp. 3, 8-9; Brief of
Plaintiff, pp. 10-14. But see Brief of Defendants, pp. 2-5, 9-10, 16-18. For a recent
case where the right to vote turned on the original method of federal acquisition,
see Arledge v. Mabry, 52 N.M. 303, 197 P.2d 884 (1948).
3 Custis v. Lane, 17 Va. (3 Munf.) 579 (1813), was the first decision on this
issue. However, the germinal case in the field was Opinion of the Justices, 42 Mass.
(1 Met.) 580 (1841).
This decision was generally followed for the succeeding
century. E.g., Herken v. Glynn, 151 Kan. 855, 101 P.2d 946 (1940) ; McMahon v.
Polk, 10 S.D. 296, 73 N.W. 77 (1897).
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exclusive jurisdiction had been ceded, holding that persons living within
such an enclave could not satisfy the state constitution's residence requireBetween 1928 and 1940 Congress provided for the
ment for voters'
application of state wrongful death and injury law to federal areas,5 granted
the states authority to extend their workmen's compensation acts to these
enclaves, 6 and gave the states permission to levy motor fuel, sales, use,
and personal income taxes in these areas.7 The result of these increases
in the effect of state power in federal areas 8 has been a reconsideration and,
in some cases, modification of the rule denying the franchise to residents of
federal enclaves. 9 Nevertheless, there are still large numbers of residents
of federal areas who are effectively denied the right to vote. 10
The court in the present case considered the question before it as one
of interpreting the intent of the legislature in amending the Utah election
laws."- However, since the Utah constitution, like that of the vast majority
of states,12 includes residence in the state as a necessary qualification for
4 Sinks v. Reese, 19 Ohio St. 306 (1869). The franchise was recovered by these
same persons through a congressional retrocession of jurisdiction to the state. See
Renner v. Bennett, 21 Ohio St 431 (1871). Problems resulting from the creation of
areas of exclusive federal jurisdiction within the states are not limited to the right
to vote. Decisions similar to those listed in note 3 supra have been rendered on
questions of divorce, estate tax, state crimes committed within federal areas, attendance at public schools, alcoholic beverage laws, and the like. See generally INTaDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE FOR THE STUDY OF JURISDICTION OVER FEDERAL AREAS
WITHIN THE STATES, JURISDICTION OVER FEDERAL AREAS WITHIN THE STATES,

pt. I, at 26-27 (1956) ; id., pt. II, at 105-248 (1957) ; Note, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 124

Current federal acquisition and state cession policies have been largely
(1952).
modified to prevent the creation of unneeded federal jurisdiction which gives rise to
these problems in federal-state relationships; nevertheless, large areas acquired
before these changes in policy are still affected by holdings concerning exclusive federal
jurisdiction. See INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE, op. cit. supra pt I, at 9-11.
5 45 Stat. 54 (1928), 16 U.S.C. § 457 (1958).
649 Stat 1938 (1936), 40 U.S.C. §290 (1958).
74 U.S.C. §§ 104-10 (1958).
8
Other changes have been made in the federal-state relationship as to federal
enclaves without resulting in reconsideration of the franchise. Examples are the
Assimilative Crimes Act of 1948, 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1958), and the declaration and
implementation of a federal policy of cooperation with the states to aid in the application of state educational programs to the inhabitants of federal enclaves, see 64
Similar arrangements
Stat. 1100 (1950), as amended, 20 U.S.C. §§ 236-44 (1958).
have been entered into concerning state and municipal services. See INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITEE, op. cit. supra note 4, pt. II, at 186-87.
9 Compare Arledge v. Mabry, 52 N.M. 303, 197 P.2d 884 (1948) (relinquishment
to state of prerogatives of exclusive federal jurisdiction is not abrogation of such
jurisdiction), with Arapajolu v. McMenamin, 113 Cal. App. 2d 824, 249 P.2d 318
(Dist. Ct. App. 1952) (precedents inapplicable because congressional grant of power
to states was retrocession of concurrent jurisdiction), and Adams v. Londeree, 139
W. Va. 748, 83 S.E.2d 127 (1954) (effective retrocession of jurisdiction to establish
residence for voting and office holding). The Adams court also found support for its
decision in the changing federal acquisition policy within the state and the alteration
of the West Virginia cession statute. Compare State ex rel. Wendt v. Smith, 63
Ohio L. Abs. 31, 103 N.E.2d 822 (Dist. Ct. App. 1951) (per curiam). Moreover,
the rule of the earlier cases has been modified in a few states by statute and in others
by administrative decisions extending the right to vote to such residents. See INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE, op. cit. supra note 4, pt. IL at 224-25.
.1 Id. at 225 & n25.
11 Instant case at 613-14.

12 E.g., CAL. CoNST. art II, § 1; MAss. CONST. § 105; N.Y. CON sT. art II, § 1;
PA. CONsT. art VIII, § 1.
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voting,13 any extension of the franchise by the legislature must be within
the limits of the constitutional definition of resident.14 Moreover, the constitutional guarantee of a republican form of government 15 is inconsistent
with the idea that the several states can grant the right to vote to persons
not subject to their sovereignty. 16 Since the reported decisions 17 and the
8
underlying nature of the right to vote in a republican government ' both
indicate that the franchise cannot be extended to areas of exclusive federal
jurisdiction, the only decisional support for the present holding comes
from those cases which found a retrocession of jurisdiction in the congressional grants of state power over federal enclaves. 19 As a matter of pure
legal reasoning, however, once the United States has obtained exclusive
jurisdiction over land within a state, this jurisdiction can be returned to a
state only through a positive cession by Congress followed by the state's
acceptance; 20 anything less than this is an act of grace on the part of the
sovereign in no way affecting its sovereignty. 21 Nevertheless, assuming
that the Utah court has correctly interpreted the intention of the legislature
to extend the franchise to civilian residents of federal military reservations
within the geographic boundaries of the state,22 there are sound reasons for
13 UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 2.
14 Even if the legislature had attempted to amend the state constitution on this
point, it lacked the power to do so without electoral approval. See UTAH CONST.

art. XXIII.
15 U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 4. The nature of a "republican form of government"
requires that the governor be selected only by the governed. See STORY, CoMmENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 581 (5th ed. 1891) ; Custis v.

Lane, 17 Va. (3 Munf.) 579, 585 (1813) (argument of William Wirt); id. at 592
(opinion of Roane, J.). These writers argue that representative government is but
an extension of direct democracy which was exercised by, and only by, the residents
of the state. See also Commonwealth v. Clary, 8 Mass. 72 (1811) ; Sinks v. Reese,
19 Ohio St. 306 (1869).
16This level of constitutional reasoning has been rendered moot by the state
constitutional provisions limiting the franchise to residents. See notes 12-13 supra
and accompanying text.
17 See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
18 See note 15 supra and accompanying text. The instant case at 614 suggests
that it is within the prerogative of the legislature to set the terms of the franchise
within the state. While the opinion does not meet the reasoning that areas of exclusive federal jurisdiction are not "within the state," it does suggest that the existence
of statutory limitations on the right of residents of federal enclaves to vote implies
that this right could exist absent that limitation. As a practical matter, there seems
to be little likelihood that the states would extend the franchise to persons in no way
subject to their jurisdiction.
19 See note 9 supra.
20 The necessity of acceptance by the states to create state jurisdiction anew is
generally recognized. See INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE, op. cit. supra note 4,
pt. I, at 72-73. But see Renner v. Bennett, 21 Ohio St. 431 (1871) (state cession
of jurisdiction to federal government is mere suspension of jurisdiction).
21 The specific language and limitations of the congressional extensions of state
law to federal enclaves confirm the fact that Congress did not intend these statutory
provisions to be the basis of any argument that the federal government had surrendered its exclusive sovereignty over the areas in question. See statutes cited
notes 5-7 supra.

22
The historical reason for the legislation was the Supreme Court's grant of certiorari in the case of Allen v. Merrell, 6 Utah 2d 32, 305 P.2d 490, cert. granted, 352
U.S. 889 (1956), vacated and remanded, 353 U.S. 932 (1957) (per curiam) (on stipulation that issue was moot), in which the Supreme Court of Utah had upheld the
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upholding such legislation. Apart from the bare jurisdiction question, the
congressional extension of state taxing power 23 and applicability of state
substantive law to residents of federal enclaves 24 has given these residents
an increased interest in the formulation of state fiscal policies and legislation. Moreover, both the federal and the state governments have modified
their parts in the federal land acquisition policy to limit federal jurisdiction
to that minimum necessary for federal operations, which does not normally
include the elimination of the right to vote.25 Large numbers of residents
on military reservations are civilians 26 to whom the reasons militating
against the extension of the franchise to members of the armed forces are
not applicable.2 7 State representation in Congress is based in part on the
residents of federal enclaves. 28 Finally, the growing importance of federal
elections and the increased importance of these elections in comparison to
those of the states 29 makes state action denying the right to vote to United
States citizens whose only residence is in a federal enclave increasingly
unconscionable.
But despite the social and political reasons supporting the present
decision of the Utah court, this case and others like it are at most a secondbest device for extending the franchise. The basic flaws in the case's legal
state's right to deny the franchise to residents of Indian reservations. Hence the main
reason for the repeal was a desire to render moot any federal attack on a possible
state discrimination against Indians under U.S. CONST. amend. XV. At the same
time, there are suggestions in the legislative history that the legislature also intended
to remove the bar against voting by civilian residents of federal military reservations.

Brief of Plaintiff, pp. 8-10. This interpretation was taken by OPs. (UTAH) Anr'y GEN.
58-084 (1958), but was reversed by a later opinion dated May 17, 1960. See Complaint, p. 7. Even following the decision of the court in the instant case, prospective
voters resident on military bases are required to establish voting residence in Utah,
including residence within an election district. See Brief of Defendants, pp. 19-23;
Petition for Rehearing, pp. 6-7.
23 See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
24 See notes 5-6 .rupra and accompanying text; note 8 supra.
25 See INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE, op. cit. supra note 4, pt. I, at 9-11.
26
There are approximately 68,000 civilian residents (military dependents included)
on military reservations in the three states of California, Kansas, and Virginia. INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMIrrTEE, op. cit. supra note 4, pt. I, at 84-96. No statistics exist
either separating these figures into civilian technicians as against military dependents
or extending
these figures to the entire United States.
27
Federal control over military personnel is effective to prevent the normal establishment of a domicile since such persons are subject to transfer from the state against
their will; moreover, the control over these persons by the military commander is
sufficient to deny or grant access to the polls at will and would permit the manipulation
of state elections by the assignment of personnel within the various states at the will
of the federal government The United States exercises no such control over civilian
employees
who are not bound to serve for a term of enlistment or conscription.
28
For purposes of the enumeration required in U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 2, as the
basis of apportionment of representatives in Congress, residents of federal areas have
been credited to the states in which the enclave is located. See 1 U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, A REPORT OF THE SEVENTEENTH DECENNIAL
CENSUS OF THE UNIrD STATES, CENSUS OF PoPuLTION: 1950, at ix (1952).
29
Illustrative of this change are the federal government's use of the commerce
power to regulate wages, hours, collective bargaining, agriculture, and other matters
formerly viewed as purely local concerns, increased direct federal enforcement of
constitutional civil rights, the prosecution of criminals for federal income tax evasion,
and the like. Similarly, the disproportionate growth of the federal budget and number
of employees as compared to those of the states exemplifies this trend.
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reasoning 30 and the improbability that a uniform right to vote will result
from this ad hoc method of dealing with the problem 3 1 both militate for
another approach. However reasonable and valuable the present decision
may be, the ultimate solution lies not in the proliferation of judicial attempts
at enfranchisement but in the enactment of a broad federal retrocession
32
statute accompanied by uniform state acceptance legislation.

HABEAS CORPUS-PEIIER's

DismissAL FRom CUSTODY

RENDERS MOOT HIS COLLATFRAL ATTACK ON STATE CONvicT oN
Petitioner was convicted of forgery in a state court. After exhausting
his state remedies,' he petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in a federal
district court, alleging a denial of due process at his trial.2 After a hearing,
4
3
the district court dismissed the petition. The court of appeals affirmed,
and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 5 Before the Court could decide
the merits of his case, petitioner was released from prison on an absolute
discharge. 6 As a convicted felon, however, he remained disenfranchised
under Texas law. 7 The Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion, dismissed
30 See notes 20-21 sipra and accompanying text
31 See INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE, op. cit. supra note 4, pt. I, at 81-122.
32This approach is recommended in INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE, op. cit.
supra note 4, pt. I, at 69-79, as the only satisfactory solution not only to the extension
of the franchise but also to the multitude of other problems resulting from the
existence of federal areas of exclusive jurisdiction.
I Exhaustion of state remedies is a prerequisite to the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus by a federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1958), Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200,
204-05 (1950). See generally Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Impact of an Abortive
State Proceeding, 74 HARV. L. REv. 1315, 1324-32, 1363-73 (1961) ; Note, Exhaustion
of State Remedies as a Condition for Federal Habeas Corpus, 34 MINN. L. Rlv. 653,
658 (1950).
2
The burden of petitioner's contention was that the trial court's refusal to appoint
counsel to defend him made his trial a sham. See Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574,
578-81 (1960) (dissenting opinion of Warren, C.J.); Parker v. Ellis, 258 F.2d 937,
941 (5th Cir. 1958) (dissenting opinion), cert. disnissed as moot, 362 U.S. 574
(1960). The majority admitted that the facts stated in the petition for certiorari
made an "impressive . . . showing for the exercise of this Court's discretionary
jurisdiction . . . ." Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. at 575.
3Unreported.
4 Parker v. Ellis, 258 F.2d 937 (5th Cir. 1958).

See also Parker v. Ellis, 359 U.S. 951
5 Parker v. Ellis, 359 U.S. 924 (1959).
(1959) (appointment of counsel).
6 Petitioner was released from custody for good behavior after serving almost
five years of his seven-year sentence. His release came more than three years after
the Supreme Court had denied certiorari in his original collateral attack in the state
courts and he had applied to the federal district court for relief, seven months after
his second petition for certiorari was filed, and three months after certiorari was
granted. Had petitioner not been released from prison, his cause would have been
adjudicated.
7 See T.X. ELECTiON CODE art. 5.01(4) (1952).
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the writ of certiorari, holding that the termination of petitioner's custody
had rendered the case moot 8 and had thereby deprived the Court of "jurisdiction to deal with the merits of petitioner's claim." 9 Four Justices dissented.' ° Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574 (1960)."
Historically, habeas corpus has been a procedure for inquiring into the
legality of a prisoner's detention. 12 At common law the writ would not
issue without a showing of restraint on the petitioner's liberty.' 3 The
federal habeas corpus statute,' 4 which codifies the common-law writ,15
provides that "the writ of Habeas Corpus shall not extend to a prisoner
unless . . . [inter alia] he is in custody in violation of the Constitution
or laws or treaties of the United States ... ." ' In consonance with
this provision the federal courts have held that they have no jurisdiction to
inquire into the validity of a petitioner's conviction when he is free on
bail,' 7 or has not yet begun to serve his sentence,' 8 or has been released on
8 The grounds are discussed in text accompanying note 40

infra.

9VWhile joining in the Court's opinion, Justices Harlan and Clark concurred for
the further reason that outstanding convictions against the petitioner in other states
would equally deprive him of voting rights under Texas law, and therefore the case
did not present a case or controversy within the meaning of article III of the Constitution. See notes 37-39 infra.
10 Mr. Justice Douglas (joined by Chief Justice Warren) dissented on the
ground that a writ of habeas corpus inc pro tunc was a proper remedy under the
facts of the case. The Chief Justice authored a second dissenting opinion (joined
by justices Black, Douglas, and Brennan) which assumed arguendo that habeas
corpus minc pro tunc was not available, but contended that the Court nevertheless
had jurisdiction to provide an appropriate remedy, issuance of the writ itself no
longer being necessary. But cf. note 45 infra.
"1 The case was remanded with instructions that the court of appeals vacate its
judgment and direct the district court to vacate its order and dismiss the application.
This disposition eliminates any precedential force of the original dismissal on the
merits. See Comment, Disposition of Moot Cases by the United States Supreme
Court, 23 U. CHI. L. REv. 77 (1955).
12 See McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131, 136-37 (1934). See also 9 HoLDswORTH,
A HisroaY OF ENGLISH LAW 118 (3d ed. 1944) ; INGERSOLL, THE HISTORY AND LAW
OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 1 (1849).
13 See 9 HoLDSwoRTr,
op. cit. supra note 12, at 108-25; INGERSOLL, Op. Cit. supra
note 12, at 1-46. See generally HURD, HABEAS CORPUS (1858).
14

28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-55 (1958).

'5 See McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131, 136 (1934); Sunal v. Large, 157 F.2d
165, 168 (4th Cir. 1946), aft'd, 332 U.S. 174 (1947) ; Ex parte Stewart, 47 F. Supp.
415, 417 (S.D. Cal. 1942). Note that the words "for the purpose of an inquiry into
the cause of restraint of liberty" in 36 Stat. 1167, ch. 229 (1925), were omitted from
the current statute as merely descriptive of the writ. See H.R REP. No. 308, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. A178 (1948) (app.). See also Stallings v. Splain, 253 U.S. 339
(1920); Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564 (1885). However, the Supreme Court has
substantially enlarged the scope of inquiry under habeas corpus proceedings. See
Note, The Freedom Writ-The Expanding Use of Federal Habeas Corpus, 61 HAxv.
L. REv. 657, 660-62 (1947).

1628 U.S.C. §2241(c) (3)

(1958).

17 See Johnson v. Hoy, 227 U.S. 245

(1913); United States ex rel. Potts v.
Rabb, 141 F.2d 45 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 727 (1944).
IsSee McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131 (1934) ; Dodd v. Peak, 47 F.2d 430 (D.C.
Cir. 1931) ; Mabry v. Beaumont, 290 Fed. 205 (9th Cir. 1923).
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parole. 19 In addition, the courts of appeals have refused to review habeas
corpus cases in which the petitioner has been released from custody while
the appeal is pending.20 And the Supreme Court has consistently denied
certiorari if the petitioner is no longer in the custody of the particular
respondent.2 1
Congress has provided another avenue of attack for prisoners incarcerated under federal convictions. This provision, section 2255 of the
Judicial Code,22 permitting a motion to vacate, modify, or set aside a sentence, is intended to be used in lieu of the traditional writ as the normal
means of collateral attack upon federal convictions. 23 Although section 2255
retains the "in custody" requirement of the habeas corpus statute as a
prerequisite to the exercise of jurisdiction, the Court held in Pollard v.
United States 2 4 that the cause of a petitioner who had been released from
custody after certiorari had been granted but before the case could be
decided was not moot and could still be disposed of on the merits, since
petitioner still suffered from possible unspecified collateral consequences
of his conviction. 2 5 But in Heflin v. United States,2 6 when a petitioner
sought relief from a conviction before he had even started to serve the
sentence under it, a majority of the Court,2 7 ignoring Pollard,simply stated
10 See Factor v. Fox, 175 F.2d 626 (6th Cir. 1949); Van Meter v. Sanford,
99 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1938). The disposition of these cases may rest either on the
fact that the petitioner was not sufficiently restrained for the writ to issue, or on the
more technical ground that the control to which petitioner was subjected while on
parole was not exercised by respondent jailer. See Van Meter v. Sanford, mupra.
If a petitioner, after completing a sentence based on an allegedly invalid conviction,
is subsequently taken into custody pursuant to a multiple-offender statute, habeas
corpus jurisdiction again attaches and the writ is available to attack the prior conviction. United States ex rel. Savini v. Jackson, 250 F.2d 349 (2d Cir. 1957) ; New
York ex rel. Bowers v. Fay, 171 F. Supp. 558 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), aff'd sub noma.,
United States ex rel. Bowers v. Fay, 266 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1959). See Reitz,
Federal Habeas Corpus: Postconviction Remedy For State Prisoners, 108 U. PA.
L. Rnv. 461, 488-89 (1960).
20 See, e.g., Witte v. Ferber, 219 F.2d 113 (3d Cir. 1955); United States v.
Dixon, 199 F.2d 753 (8th Cir. 1952) ; Factor v. Fox, supra note 19.
2
1 Zimmerman v. Walker, 319 U.S. 744 (1943) (release); Tornello v. Hudspeth,
318 U.S. 792 (1943) (pardon); Weber v. Squier, 315 U.S. 810 (1942) (parole).
Similarly the Court denied a prisoner leave to petition for a writ of habeas corpus
when it was clear that before the return could be made the prisoner's sentence would
expire. Ex parte Baez, 177 U.S. 378 (1900).
22 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1958).
The purpose of § 2255, whose remedy must be pursued in the court of sentencing
rather than in the district of incarceration, is not to detract from the scope of habeas
corpus, but merely to relieve the pressure of habeas corpus petitions in those districts
in which federal penitentiaries are situated. See the thorough examination of the
legislative history in United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 210-19 (1952).
24 352 U.S. 354, 358 (1957).
25 See note 39 infra.
26 358 U.S. 415 (1959).
2
7 Mr. Justice Douglas's opinion for the Court said a majority of the justices
believed custody to be essential to the Court's jurisdiction under § 2255. A concurring
opinion identified the majority as consisting of Justices Frankfurter, Clark, Harlan,
Whittaker, and Stewart. The case, however, was disposed of on its merits with
another jurisdictional basis. See note 28 infra.
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that relief under section 2255 is available only to prisoners in actual custody
under the sentence they are attacking.s
The majority of the Court, in arriving at its decision in the instant
case, relied on three denials of certiorari 29 in cases in which the petitioner
had been released from custody before the Court had acted on his petition.
Although the Court has frequently admonished that a denial of certiorari
carries no judgment on the merits,30 the majority explained that "it is
precisely because a denial of a petition for certiorari without more has no
significance as a ruling that an explicit statement of the reason for denial
means what it says." 31 The Court concluded that since each of the three
writs had been denied on the ground that the petitioner's release from the
respondent's custody had rendered the cause moot,3 2 the release of petitioner in the instant case after certiorari had been granted but before a
decision could be rendered also deprived the Court of jurisdiction.3 3 In
reaching this conclusion, the Court relegated Pollard, a factually indistinguishable situation under the analogous section 2255, to footnote, dismissing it as an "unconsidered assumption" which had been subsequently
overruled by Heflin.3 4 Yet Heflin, although dealing with the same general
problem as Pollard-the jurisdictional significance of the "in custody"
phrase of section 2255-did not involve the peculiar mootness problem of
that case and the present one. The issue in Heflin was the district court's
jurisdiction at the outset, inasmuch as the petitioner there had not yet
begun to serve the sentence under the conviction he sought to attack.
Therefore, while a majority of the Justices indulged in general statements
to the effect that custody was essential to jurisdiction,3 5 the case does not
28 The Court did, however, extend relief under FaD. R. CRn. P. 35, which permits correction of an illegal sentence at any time. Such alternative relief was not
available in Pollard,where the petitioner's claim was that he was not present at the
sentencing as required by FED. R. CRmr. P. 43; the remedy there was resentencing,
cf. Howell v. United States, 172 F.2d 213, cert. denied, 337 U.S. 906 (1949). See
4 BARRON, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PR0CEDURE § 2301, at 302 (1951). Relief under

Rule2935 was, of course, not available in the instant case.

Zimmerman v. Walker, 319 U.S. 744 (1943) (prisoner released from summary military detention); Tornello v. Hudspeth, 318 U.S. 792 (1943) (petitioner
granted a presidential pardon); Weber v. Squier, 315 U.S. 810 (1942) (petitioner

paroled).
3
0Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912 (1950)

(Frankfurter, 3.);

instant case at 588-90 (dissenting opinion of Warren, C.J.).
31 Instant case at 576.
32The orders in the three cases followed a similar pattern: "Petition for writ
of certiorari . . . denied on the ground that the cause is moot, it appearing that
petitioner . . . [method of release specified] and that he is no longer in the respondent's custody." Weber v. Squier, 315 U.S. 810 (1942). See, substantially
similar, Zimmerman v. Walker, 319 U.S. 744 (1943); Tornello v. Hudspeth, 318
U.S. 792 (1943). Why the Court in the instant case felt constrained to pin down
the meaning of "moot" and place its holding on a broader ground than that the
petitioner was no longer in the responden's custody is not apparent.
3

Compare Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868).
4Instant case at 575 nl. Compare note 36 infra.

3
3

5See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
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provide a definitive answer to the question of whether jurisdiction, valid
at its inception, may be lost-even after the granting of certiorari-because
of the petitioner's release from custody. 36 The Court's summary rejection
of Pollardin the instant case on such tenuous grounds would appear clearly
unwarranted.
However, the Court's characterization of Pollard as an "unconsidered
assumption," although cryptic, would appear quite accurate. In Pollard,
the Court went right to the constitutional issue-whether petitioner's release
from custody rendered the cause moot in the constitutional sense of case
or controversy 37-- without considering the statutory problem. It concluded that the possibility 38 of collateral consequences-legally imposed
disabilities, flowing from the conviction, which survive the completion of
the sentence-satisfied the constitutional limitations on its jurisdiction.39
In contrast, the Court in the instant case considered the question of mootness and petitioner's release from custody solely from the point of view of
the statutory limitations of its jurisdiction under the "in custody" provision
36 Indeed, if Heflin. (invalid jurisdiction ab initio) did overrule Pollard (jurisdiction lost after commencement of the action), see text at note 34 supra, the close
similarity betveen § 2255 and habeas corpus suggests that the instant case should be
controlled by McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131 (1934), a habeas corpus case on all fours
with Heflin.
37 See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239-41 (1937); Mills v.
Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653 (1895); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.)
304, 337 (1816). See generally Diamond, Federal Jurisdiction to Decide Moot Cases,
94 U. PA. L. REv. 125 (1946); Note, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 772 (1955). Justices
Harlan and Clark declared the instant case moot on this ground. They reasoned
that petitioner's out-of-state convictions already deprived him of his voting rights
under Texas law and therefore that a mere declaration of invalidity in this case
would not help him in this respect. The dissenters attacked this premise, claiming
the Texas law on the matter was not clear. Instant case at 592 (dissenting opinion
of Warren, C.J.) ; id. at 598 n.5 (dissenting opinion of Douglas, J.). The crux of
the Harlan-Clark position, nevertheless, is that petitioner can show no legal interest
-no set of operative facts on which the proceeding could give effective relief to the
petitioner as a party in the case. Cf. Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429
(1952) (graduation of child rendered moot complaint that bible reading in public
school was unconstitutional); St. Pierre v. United States, 319 U.S. 41 (1943)
(certiorari dismissed where petitioner had already served sentence from which he
was appealing). In St Pierre v. United States, supra, the Court stated that petitioner
had not "shown that under either state or federal law further penalties or disabilities
can be imposed on him as a result of the judgment which has now been satisfied.
• . . The moral stigma of a judgment which no longer affects legal rights does
not present a case or controversy for appellate review." 319 U.S. at 43.
38 Note that in the instant case petitioner alleged a specific disability--disenfranchisement under Texas law. See note 7 supra and accompanying text. However,
it is not clear whether invalidation of his conviction would have relieved this disability.
See note 37 supra.
39 352 U.S. at 358. The Court in Pollard cited two cases to sustain its conclusion
that the case was not moot in the constitutional sense of a case or controversy, see
note 37 supra and accompanying text: United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954)
(proceeding in the nature of coram nobis attacking a federal conviction) ; Fiswick v.
United States, 329 U.S. 211 (1946) (direct review of federal conspiracy conviction).
Both opinions recognized the possible incurrence of civil disabilities as sufficient
collateral consequences to sustain the cause after the prisoner had been released
from custody. Only Fiswick v. United States, supra, however, spoke of any specific
consequences: a weakening of the prisoner's defense against foreseeable deportation
proceedings and an increased difficulty in obtaining citizenship papers which his
outstanding conviction would cause. 329 U.S. at 222. See generally Note, 59 YALE
L.J. 786 (1950). It would appear, therefore, that Pollard and the above-mentioned
cases considerably undermine, if not overrule, the St. Pierre decision, see note 37

supra.
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of the habeas corpus statute.40 In this context the existence of an interest in
the litigation sufficient to satisfy the constitutional limitations on the Court's
jurisdiction is not determinative; rather, the question is whether the cause
remains one which the habeas corpus statute may properly be invoked to
adjudicate.
Nevertheless, it does not necessarily follow that the Court's assumption
of statutory jurisdiction in Pollard was erroneous. Indeed, it is arguable
that the "in custody" phrase of section 2255 and the habeas corpus statute
should be treated like any other congressionally imposed jurisdictional requirement and be subject to the general rule that subsequent events do not
deprive federal courts of statutory jurisdiction validly acquired at the outset.41 However, there is a fundamental distinction between the usual jurisdictional requirement-such as the amount in controversy or the citizenship
of the parties-and the custody requirements of section 2255 and the habeas
corpus statute. The distinction lies in the nature of the relief sought and
the relation of the jurisdictional requirement to the court's power to grant
that relief. In the case of a civil action for damages, for example, the
ability of the court to grant the relief sought is in no way affected by subsequent events which change the operative facts as to damages upon which
the court's jurisdiction was originally predicated. 42 In the case of habeas
corpus, however, the relief sought is so conjoined to the fact which establishes jurisdiction at the outset 43 that the prerequisite of jurisdiction-the
custody of the petitioner-must continue to be met throughout the course
of the action 44 in order for the relief sought-petitioner's release-to be
effective.4 5 This analysis implicitly accepts the historical limitations on the
40 See generally ROBERTSON & KIRKHA-M, JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES, § 293 (Wolfson & Kurland ed. 1951).
41

See, e.g., Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91 (1957)

(diversity of citizenship

destroyed); St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283 (1938)
(amount in controversy diminished below jurisdictional amount); Hum v. Oursler,
289 U.S. 238 (1933) (federal ground upon which jurisdiction was predicated found
lacking in substance). See also Anderson-Thompson, Inc. v. Logan Grain Co., 238

F.2d 598 (10th Cir. 1956)

(federal jurisdiction determined when complaint filed).

For an application of this principle to a habeas corpus proceeding, see United States

ex rel. Circella v. Neelly, 115 F. Supp 615 (N.D. Ill. 1953). "Constitutional" mootness, of course, will oust a federal court of jurisdiction whenever it is recognized.
42 See St Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., .mpra note 41.
43 The "in custody" requirement is not codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1958) as a
condition precedent to habeas corpus jurisdiction; rather it is contained in the list
of causes for which federal habeas corpus may issue in 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (1958).
44 Compare the jurisdictional limitations pertaining to the equity jurisdiction of
the federal courts: frequently in equity the relief sought can be of aid to the petitioner
only so long as there is a physical object or particular transaction upon which the
court's order can have an effect See, e.g., Wingert v. First Nat'l Bank, 223 U.S.
670 (1912) (appeal from decree refusing to enjoin the construction of a new building
dismissed when the building was completed) ; Brill v. General Industrial Enterprises,
Inc., 234 F.2d 465 (3d Cir. 1956) (appeal from decree refusing to enjoin sale of
corporate assets dismissed after sale consummated).
45
Chief Justice Warren's dissent asserted that the habeas corpus remedy could
be beneficial in the instant case even though petitioner was already released from his
allegedly illegal imprisonment This assertion assumes that the Court may formulate
remedies other than release and that after issuance of the writ becomes unnecessary
because petitioner has been released, the "in custody" requirement ceases to operate
to deprive the court of power to formulate a remedy, since the statute requires the
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remedy provided by the writ of habeas corpus. 46 But the broadened scope
of inquiry which the Court has permitted in habeas corpus proceedings 47__
a clear departure from the writ's history-makes it uncomfortable to try
to explain the Court's rejection of Pollardin terms of a slavish subservience
to traditional notions about the writ. If the statute, interpreted in light
of the history of habeas corpus, is as compelling as the Court suggests, it
would seem not only that Pollard's"unconsidered assumption" of statutory
jurisdiction was clearly erroneous, but that the entire Pollard court completely missed the controlling jurisdictional point in the case.48
It is possible only to speculate about the unarticulated reasons which
may have motivated the Court in the instant case to retreat from the position taken in Pollard. Factually the cases are indistinguishable, except that
Pollard was attacking a federal conviction whereas the petitioner in the
instant case sought to upset a state proceeding. It may well be that the
reason lies in that distinction. Perhaps the Court is more willing to construe its jurisdictional limitations liberally when the scope of the demanded
inquiry lies wholly in the federal system than when the inquiry would
probe state judicial processes. But the similarity of section 2255 and
habeas corpus makes it awkward to limit the precedential value of Pollard
to collateral attacks under section 2255. 49 The unconsidered part of
Pollard would appear to be not so much its assumption of jurisdiction as
its utter failure to appreciate the ramifications of its conclusion. The
prospect which the Court faced in the present case was either to expand
jurisdiction under the habeas corpus statute or to contract jurisdiction
under section 2255. The common-law fiber of the habeas corpus statute8 o
and the explicit statutory limitations upon the writ's issuance would appear
to support the Court's choice. The power of the federal courts to issue the
writ, even where the petitioner is in custody, is not unfettered: exhaustion
of state remedies is a prerequisite to federal jurisdiction; 51 thus federal
intervention may be invoked only after the state itself has failed to cure a
denial of federal rights. This limitation may disclose an intention that the
court to "dispose of the matter as law and justice require." 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1958).
The main failing of this argument is that it does not comport with the traditional
notion that the writ itself is the remedy, that the writ's function is to get the prisoner
released from detention, and that any other relief is ancillary. See McNally v. Hill,
293 U.S. 131, 139 (1934). However, even assuming the dissenters' departure from
tradition may be warranted under the circumstances, they fail to specify what sort
of relief they would grant the petitioner. Justice Douglas, in his dissent, suggests
that the proper remedy is a writ of habeas corpus mwc pro tunc. Instant case at
598-99. But how this would function is left unanswered.
46 See notes 12-15 supra and accompanying text.
47 See Note, supra note 15.
48 Although four Justices dissented in Pollard, they did not raise the statutory
problem; rather, they disagreed with the Court's holding on the merits. 352 U.S.
at 363.
49 See notes 22-23 supra and accompanying text. In fact, the Pollard decision
has been followed in a habeas corpus attack on a state conviction, Dickson v. Castle,
244 F.2d 665 (9th Cir. 1957).
50 See notes 12-15 supra and accompanying text.
51 See note 1 supra.
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federal courts should act only in the direst cases,5 2 thereby mitigating the
irritation which inevitably results from federal scrutiny of state processes.5 3
The cryptic phrase "in custody," when illuminated by the history of the
Great Writ, seems to be another limitation on federal power. For, while
the price of federal scrutiny-measured by its chafing effect on federalstate relations-may be well spent when a denial of constitutional rights is
still resulting in restraint on the petitioner's physical liberty, the same
price may be excessive when only the collateral consequences of a denial
remain.54 It is disturbing that any deprivation of constitutional rights
should go unremedied.5 5 But, however more satisfying the result in Pollard
may be, other considerations seem to dictate the Court's retreat from that
position in habeas corpus cases. Until Congress manifests a clearer
intention 56 that federal courts should enjoy broader powers to protect
federal rights, the Court appears bound to limit their habeas corpus jurisdiction to cases involving continuing restraints of liberty.57
52

See Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672, 679-80 (1948) ; Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S.
114, 117 (1944). 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1958) is declaratory of the judge-made rule as
to exhaustion of state remedies enunciated in Ex parte Hawk, supra. H.R. REP.

No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. A180 (1947) (app.); see Parker, Limiting the Abuse

of Habeas Corpus, 8 F.R.D. 171, 178 (1949).
53Report of the Habeas Corpus Committee of the Conference of Chief Justices
(1954), in Hearings on HR. 5649 Before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Coinmittee on the JTudiciary, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 108, 109 (1955). See Reitz, Federal
Habeas Corpus: Postconviction Remedy For State Prisoners, 108 U. PA. L. REv.
461, 524 (1960). See generally Beverly, Federal-State Conflicts in; the Field of
Habeas Corpus, 41 CALIF. L. REv. 483 (1953).
54 See generally Rogge & Gordon, Habeas Corpus, Civil Rights, and the Federal
System, 20 U. CHl. L. REv. 509 (1953).
55 Especially when the blame lies with delays in the federal courts. See note 6
supra.
56 The Court has followed a discernible policy of construing narrowly jurisdictional statutes which impinge on state judicial process. See Thomson v. Gaskill,
315 U.S. 442, 446 (1949) (diversity statute strictly construed) ; Indianapolis v. Chase

Natl Bank, 314 U.S. 63, 76-77 (1941)
(1934)

(same); Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 270

(federal question statute strictly construed) ; Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U.S.

521, 525-26 (1932) (federal courts! equity power strictly limited). In Healey v. Ratta,
supra, Mr. Justice Stone, speaking for the Court, said: "Due regard for the rightful
independence of state governments, which should actuate federal courts, requires
that they scrupulously confine their own jurisdiction to the precise limits which the
statute has defined." 292 U.S. at 270.
57 In the light of the instant case, the present habeas corpus statute is clearly inadequate to meet the problem of post-sentence civil disabilities imposed by the states.
Certainly these represent deprivations of liberty in its broadest sense. See generally,
Holtzoff, Loss of Civil Rights by Conviction of Crime, Fed. Prob., April-June 1942,

p. 18; Note, 37 VA. L. REv. 105 (1951). This problem is compounded by the lengthy
process of appeal in the federal courts, see note 6 supra. These circumstances call

for Congress to act. The most obvious way of meeting the problem would be to
amend the habeas corpus statute. But the historical notions of the Great Writ and
its function suggest the desirability, if not the need, for another approach. A possible
solution would be to amend the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02
(1958). Since this act, as presently interpreted, neither augments nor diminishes
federal jurisdiction, Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 669 (1950),
a plaintiff must not only present a justiciable controversy but also fit his case within
one of the existing federal jurisdictional statutes. See generally 6 Moopa, FEDERAL
PRAcTIc
57.23 (2d ed. 1953). Any amendment in this area, therefore, would require
the enactment of a substantive, rather than a procedural, declaratory judgment provision.
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The township of Warrington is one of seven municipalities comprising
the Central Bucks Sanitary Landfill Authority, a public corporation formed
pursuant to the Pennsylvania Municipal Authorities Act of 1945.1 The
authority was established in 1956 by a voluntary agreement entered into
by the governing bodies of each of the seven municipalities for the purpose
of providing for garbage and trash disposal. After its inception, the authority acquired land and equipment and commenced disposal and landfill
operations, financing itself both by charging for services and by assessing
member municipalities. Early in 1960, the Board of Supervisors of
Warrington Township determined to withdraw from the authority and
submitted to the Authority Board a resolution to that effect. The Authority Board refused to consent to 'Warrington's withdrawal, and a complaint
in mandamus was brought to compel that consent. Preliminary objections
by the defendant authority were sustained, and the court dismissed the
action, holding the grant or denial of consent to be discretionary with the
Board. Township of Warrington v. Central Bucks Sanitary Landfill Authority, 10 Bucks 181 (Pa. C.P. 1960).
A municipal authority in Pennsylvania may be organized only as provided by the Municipal Authorities Act.2 Under this act it is possible to
establish governmental units which cross political boundaries without
further state enabling legislation or special municipal elections. The
act permits one or more municipalities 3 to form authorities for a wide range
of self-supporting projects connected with public welfare and improvement.4 Any deficit financing must be by authority revenue bonds, 5 and the
6
credit of the municipalities is not to be pledged to support the bond issue.
The statute also sets forth the steps necessary for organization 7 and regu1 Municipal Authorities Act of 1945, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 303 (1957). This
act is derived from the Municipal Authorities Act, Pa. Laws 1935, act 191, the first
Pennsylvania legislation of this type.
2 PA. STAT. ANN. tit 53, §§ 301-22 (1957).
3

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53,

§ 303A (1957).

4 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 306A (1957).
5
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 306B(i) (1957). It is this feature which forms the
basis of the popularity of the authority form in Pennsylvania and elsewhere, for,
when combined with the dictate that the credit of the municipality not be pledged,
note 6 infra, it is possible to circumvent constitutional debt limitations. Note, 55
Dicn. L. Rav. 141 (1950). Technically, these bonds, if payable from the whole of
the authority's revenue sources, may be general obligation bonds. The designation
"revenue bonds" is, however, accurate for practical purposes and is the commonly
used term. See Fordham, Revenue Bond Sanctions, 42 COLUM. L. R~v. 395, 399-400
(1942).

6 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 306C (1957).

7 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 303 (1957). The most important step is the passing
of resolutions of intention by the governing boards of the municipalities which wish
to form the authority. Once such resolutions are passed, only filing requirements
remain. It should be noted that there is no requirement that the electorate ratify
the governing board's decision. Compare note 12 infra.
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lates the procedure for withdrawal before obligations have been incurred. 8
The present dispute concerned the provisions governing such withdrawal,
for the procedural posture of the case admitted of no argument that obligations had been incurred.
The court in the instant case relied on three sentences of the statute
in reaching its conclusion that a member's withdrawal is conditioned upon
the consent of the Authority Board. The first sets out the privilege of
withdrawal: "Whenever an Authority has been incorporated by two or
more municipalities, any one or more of such municipalities may withdraw . . . ." ) Reading the word "may" as here used in conjunction
with its use in the following sentence, which provides for a municipality's
entry into an already operating authority, 0 the court concluded that "may"
could not be read so as to grant an absolute right to withdraw. In a third
sentence, beginning with the clause "if the Authority shall by resolution
express its consent to such withdrawal, or joining . . . ," 1 the court
found language clearly placing the ultimate decision in the authority itself
rather than in each member municipality. The court's construction of the
statute is compelling; it is hard to find in what the legislature has said an
absolute right in a member to withdraw unilaterally.' 2 Under Pennsyl8 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 304A (1957) provides that "whenever an Authority
has been incorporated by two or more municipalities, any one or more of such
municipalities may withdraw therefrom, but no municipality shall be permitted to
withdraw from any Authority after any obligation has been incurred by the Authority .

.

.

. If the Authority shall by resolution express its consent to such

withdrawal . . . [certain procedural steps shall be followed]." In the instant case,
the municipality alleged that no obligations had been incurred. Defendant's pleadings
being in the nature of a demurrer, it was not necessary to decide the meaning of the
term "obligations" as used in the statute. No case has yet construed the term, which
appears to have two possible meanings: first, it might refer only to the issuance of
bonds; or, second, it might encompass any debt or duty whatsoever, express or
implied.
9
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 304A (1957). (Emphasis added.) A municipality
cannot withdraw if the authority has already incurred obligations.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Many other states have established authority plans, but the range of governmental mechanisms employed to implement the aims of the plans is wide. For
example, in Illinois, a drainage district, which may extend over more than one
county, may be formed under one alternative by agreement between land owners
or as a result of a special election. I.L.. ANN. STAT. ch. 42, § 3-1 (Smith-Hurd
1956). In California, unincorporated areas may form, by election, community services
districts for general purposes. CA.. Gov'T CoDE §§ 61100-43, 61600. In Kentucky,
a park, playground, or recreation area may be developed by joint action upon a vote
of the legislative bodies involved. Ky. REV. STAT. § 97.035 (1959). Such interdistrict
plans as the Miami and Seattle "metros" and the Toronto federation are essentially
political in nature and thus relevant only insofar as they reflect the generally permanent nature of authorities. For a discussion of many aspects of such a metropolitan
plan, see Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle v. City of Seattle, 357 P.2d 863 (Wash.
1960). While many authority schemes require elections at some point in the formative
process, Pennsylvania's act does not. The requirement is usually directed only to a
majority of the electors in the district to be formed, a provision which destroys local
identification and removes the danger of the subsequent withdrawal of dissatisfied
unitary "constituents." Few statutes speak to withdrawal, but most provide for
dissolution, permitting such action to be taken only after the authority has served
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vania's public school law relating to withdrawal from joint school districts
and providing that a joint district may be discontinued 13 at any time by "a
majority vote of the school directors of the respective [component] districts ..... ," 14 an analogous result has been reached. There a court,
interpreting a contractual jointure agreement in light of both the parties'
and the legislative intent, refused to allow a member district to withdraw
unilaterally after negotiations for a building had been completed, even
though the agreement said there might be withdrawal before construction
had begun. 15
While the court's interpretation of the statute here was correct, shortcomings in the legislation are immediately apparent. It is practically impossible for a municipality to withdraw once it has signed the articles of
incorporation, for in any case in which it would be to a member's advantage
to withdraw it would likely be to the authority's advantage to deny consent.
In view of the increasing dissatisfaction not only with the use of a single
authority but with the repeated and ofttimes haphazard multiplication of
authorities in a given locality, 6 it would seem that more leeway should be
allowed for withdrawal prior to the time when obligations are incurred.
Although the advantages of the authority method seem attractive at the
outset, 17 it is only a partial solution of the problems facing modern municipalities. Many of these difficulties are created by political boundaries
established years ago which now tend to decentralize the resources of the
community and leave local government fragmented and not realistically
its purpose and has extinguished its debts. See, e.g., S.D. CODE § 52.1776 (Supp.
1960) (consumer power districts). For a statute permitting withdrawal only before
the election which will finally form the district, see N.Y. UNcoNsoL. LAws § 5938

(McKinney 1949).
1
Withdrawal need not necessarily result in discontinuance where three or more
districts are involved. Cf. Southeast Greene joint School Dist v. Dunkard Township School Dist., 396 Pa. 209, 152 A.2d 269 (1959).
14 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 17-1708 (1950). This provision has been held to
require the consent of each member district for discontinuance. Berzonsky v. Marhefko, 17 Cambria 77, 87 (Pa. C.P. 1951). The required consent may be indicated
in the agreement forming the jointure by limiting the life of the joint district to a
given number of years. See Irwin Borough School Dist. v. Huntingdon Township
School Dist., 358 Pa. 78, 55 A.2d 740 (1947).
15 Southeast Greene Joint School Dist. v. Dunkard Township School Dist., 396
Pa. 209, 152 A.2d 269 (1959).
16 See WEINTRAUB & PATTERSON, THE 'AUTHORITY' IN

PENNSYLvANIA

vii (1949);

WOOD, SUBURBIA 248 (1958); McLean, Use and Abuse of Authorities, 42 NAT'L
MuNIc. REv. 438 (1953); Martin, 'Therefore Is the Name . . Babel,' 40 NA'?L
MUNIc. REv. 70, 74 (1951); Shestack, The Public Authority, 105 U. PA. L. Rzv.
553, 567-69 (1957) ; Tobin, The Metropolitan Special District: Intercounty Metropolitan Government of Tomorrow, 14 U. MIAmi L. Rxv. 333, 335 (1960).
17 One authority has listed the advantages as follows: (1) the ability to cross
political boundaries and unify functions and services; (2) independence from debt
limitations; (3) more flexible, businesslike management; (4) incentive to efficiency
caused by the necessity of living within its income; (5) greater continuity of management; (6) relative freedom from politics, resulting in higher grade men; (7) cost
paid by users, proportionate to use. WEINTRAUB & PATTERSON, op. cit. supra note 16,
at vii-ix. At the same time, it is recognized that each of these advantages contains inherent disadvantages. For example, relative freedom from politics results
in a decrease in responsibility to the public, and the ability to cross political boundaries
postpones the development of a unified metropolitan administration.

Ibid.
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related in extent of jurisdiction to actual service areas.' 8 But the authority,
devised as a means of sweeping over such boundaries and relating governmental attack on community problems to the actual reach of those problems, 19 paradoxically adds another line to the already confused organizational chart of local government structure. 20 This proliferation is intensified where several authorities are formed within a single area, each
primarily concerned with its own raisond'etre.21 Not the least of the faults
of the authority is its relative immunity from public control,2 its board
being an appointive body and thus only indirectly responsible to the electorate. Nowhere is this better illustrated than in Pennsylvania, where
there is no point at which the voters may disapprove the operation of an
authority. Furthermore, the length of an authority agreement may be
2
inordinately long, permitted as it is by statute to run for fifty years. 3
These considerations indicate the desirability of permitting, even after
the authority has been formed, effective reconsideration by a municipality
of its decision to enter into an agreement. This can only be done by placing
the discretion to withdraw in the member municipality. Despite the fact
that a unilateral withdrawal might lead to disruption and perhaps even the
collapse of a proposed project or of the authority itself, it seems on balance
that in the early stages of an authority's organization the center of power
should remain the individual municipality rather than the creature it has
created. As the criticisms of the authority scheme indicate, careful consideration of each step and a full appreciation of all its implications should
accompany the pursuit of an authority project once conceived; a municipality should not be firmly bound until obligations have been incurredwhen more becomes involved than the desires, or even best interests, of the
individual municipalities. The legislature, having demonstrated a willingness to allow pre-obligation withdrawal, should provide measures to make
that privilege effective.
18 Nehemlds, The Public Authority: Some Legal and PracticalEffects, 47 YA.E

L.. 14, 31 (1937).
19 The companion reason for resort to authorities-the need to avoid constitutional
debt restrictions-no longer exists in some situations in Pennsylvania. Municipalities
may issue nondebt revenue bonds for some projects, e.g., sewer and electrical systems,
provided the credit of the municipality is not pledged, no debt is created, no charge
against general revenues is made, and no lien attaches to any governmental property.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §47495 (a) (1957), Beam v. Ephrata Borough, 395 Pa. 348,
149 A.2d 431 (1959). See generally Municipal Serv. Letter, April 1959, p. 4.
-o McLean, supra note 16, at 441; Nehemlds, supra note 18, at 31; Shestack,
supra note 16, at 567.
2
WooD, SUBURBrA 248, 252 (1958) ; Martin, supra note 16, at 74. To combat
this defect, multifunctional special districts have been suggested. Nehemlds, supra
note 18, at 31; Tobin, supra note 16, at 335. For criticism of such a district, see
Netherton, Area-Development Authorities: A New Form of Government by Proclamation, 8 VAND. L. REv. 678, 689-90 (1955).
22
WEINTRAUB & PATTERSON, op. cit. supra note 16, at 7; McLean, supra note 16,.
at 442-43; Netherton, supra note 21, at 696.
23PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 305A (2) (1957).
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CoumT LooKs

TO STATE LAw OF ATTORNEY-CLIENT PR-vmEG nq ACTIOx
COMPEL TEsTinMvoy BEFOM IwTR1AL REv
E SERVICE

To

An agent of the Internal Revenue Service summoned-' the defendant,
an attorney, to identify certain clients for whom he had made an anonymous
payment of back taxes. Upon defendant's refusal to reveal the taxpayers'
identity on the ground of the attorney-client privilege, the IRS petitioned
a federal district court to enforce the summons and compel defendant's
testimony.2 The court overruled defendant's motion to dismiss based on
the claimed privilege and held him in civil contempt after he declined to
name his clients in open court upon being asked to do so by the judge8
The court of appeals reversed, holding that the law of the forum-state
"should and does control" the question of privilege in a civil action to
compel testimony, and that under California law a client's identity is privileged information when its disclosure could be used "'for the purpose of
showing an acknowledgment of guilt on the part of such client of the very
offenses on account of which the attorney was employed

....

,4 Baird

v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960).
Previous decisions in actions to enforce IRS summonses and compel
attorney-defendants to testify at tax investigations, by deciding questions as
to the scope of the asserted attorney-client privilege, have implicitly recognized the existence of that privilege in administrative proceedings. 5 However, these cases did not clearly present questions as to the source-state
or federal--of the attorney-client privilege in IRS investigations. This
problem was first articulated in Falsone v. United States,6 which dealt with
the privilege of communications between accountant and client. An accountant had resisted turning over to the IRS certain books for which he
claimed his client's privilege under the law of Florida, the situs of the
transactions concerning which information was sought. Affirming an order

compelling production of the documents, the court of appeals declared that
1INT.

REv. CODE OF

1954, § 7602.

2 INT. Rzv. CoDE OF 1954, §§ 7402(b), 7604(b).
3Koerner v. Baird, 59-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 73218, 73223 (S.D. Cal., 1959), rev'd in
part, 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960). Paradoxically, the lower court found that the
defendant did not know the identity of his clients, id. at 73221; he had dealt exclusively
with his clients' accountants and attorney. The trial court's refusal to order the
defendant to name the accountants and the lawyer with whom he had dealt was
affirmed by the court of appeals on the government's cross-appeal. 279 F.2d at 635.
As to the substance of the court's holding-that the clients' identities were privileged
under the facts of the case-see 47 VA. L. REv. 126 (1961).
4 Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d at 633, quoting 97 C.J.S. Witnesses § 283, at 803
(1957).
5 United States v. Sale, 228 F.2d 682 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1006
(1956); Chapman v. Goodman, 219 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1955); United States v.
Boccuto, 175 F. Supp. 886 (D.N.J.), appeal dismissed per curiam for want of jurisdiction, 274 F.2d 860 (3d Cir. 1959) ; Gretsky v. Miller, 160 F. Supp. 914 (D. Mass.
1958); Application of House, 144 F. Supp. 95 (N.D. Cal. 1956); United States v.
Willis; 145 F. Supp. 365 (M.D. Ga. 1955).
6205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 864 (1953).
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the question before the district court had been the scope of privilege in an
administrative tax inquiry. Therefore, even assuming that the proceedings
in the district court were controlled by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,7 and that Rule 43 (a), governing the admissibility of evidence, would
require recognition of a state-sanctioned privilege in the enforcement action,
state law could not extend to nor affect the district court's decision to order
testimony before the IRS. A tax investigation, the court assumed, may be
"subject to the same testimonial privileges as judicial proceedings"; 8 but,
without clarifying to which "judicial proceedings" it was alluding, 9 the
court held that federal and not state law should govern the scope of the
privilege issue presented. In rejecting the defendant's claim as to the documents in his possession, the court evoked the concept of federal law as governing privilege questions in IRS investigations only to demonstrate the
inapplicability by its own force of the state privilege statute asserted by
defendant. The court did not discuss the source of the substantive rules
by which federal privilege law should be elaborated-whether they should
be fashioned by federal judges using common-law techniques, or should be
expressly taken up from state law deemed compatible with the federal
scheme.
In In re Albert Lindley Lee Memorial Hospital,° the IRS sought
to require a hospital to reveal the names of patients admitted under the care
of a physician who was being investigated." The court of appeals, although
affirming the decision below in favor of the IRS, rejected the district court's
opinion that state law should control, and expressly adopted the statement
in Falsone that federal law governs the extent of privilege in a tax investigation.' 2 The court reiterated Falsone's assumption that an administrative inquiry "is subject to the same testimonial privileges as judicial proceedings," 13 without analyzing whether all judicial proceedings in which
the defendant's testimony might be called for would recognize the same
scope of privilege.14 Apparently assuming that the only relevant "proceeding" would arise in New York, as had the IRS investigation, and in a federal court which would adopt state privilege under Rule 43 (a), the court
was willing to look to the substance of state law and found no quarrel with
the district court's holding that the information sought was without the
scope of New York's doctor-patient privilege.' 5
7 See FED. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(3).

8 205 F.2d at 738, citing McMann v. SEC, 87 F.Zd 377, 378 (2d Cir.) (L.
Hand, 3.) (dictum), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 684 (1937).
9 See note 31 infra.
10209 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 960 (1954), 67 HAv. L.
REv. 1272 (1954).

11 The doctor was permitted to intervene in the proceeding, and on appeal it
was assumed
that he had standing to do so. 209 F.2d at 123.
12 Ibid.
13 Id. at 123-24 (dictum).
14 See note 31 infra.
15 See N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT §§ 352, 354.
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The principal distinction between Falsone and Lee Hospital on the one
hand and the instant case on the other lies in the conduct of the enforcement proceeding in the district court. In the earlier cases, the IRS sought
documents and testimony and the judge ordered compliance before the IRS.
The present case involved testimony only, and when the defendant failed
to comply with the court's order to testify before the IRS, he was called
back into court and asked by the judge to reveal the names of his clients in
court.1 6 Since the trial court held the information required to answer its
question unprivileged, it had no occasion to pass on the issue of defendant's
privilege before the IRS. Thus the question answered in Falsone and Lee
Hosptial--whatlaw governs privilege in a federal administrative investiga17
tion-was not squarely before the court of appeals in the instant case.
Assuming the district judge had the power himself to ask the ultimate question in court,' 8 he was not compelled to by statute, and need not have. Thus
the decision of the instant case that state privilege law governs seems to
make the defendant's right to refrain from answering turn on the fortuity
of where the question is asked, and whether the judge decides to ask it.
If the law of privilege in court differs from that in the administrative investigation, a privilege in one proceeding can be rendered nugatory by an
order to testify in the other. As a practical matter the two privileges must
be equivalent; consequently, the court's reliance on Rule 43 (a) "o and the
20
seems to have been misguided.
other precedents it found persuasive
While the federal rules no doubt applied to the enforcement proceeding
16 Koerner v. Baird, 59-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 73223.
17 The opinion of the court of appeals could be read as ignoring this distinction
and deciding the question of privilege in the administrative proceeding. The facts
of the case, however, preclude such a reading. See note 18 infra.
18 This power is not expressly granted by either § 7402 or § 7604(b) of IxT.
REV. CoDE OF 1954. § 7602(2) empowers the Secretary or his delegate "to summon
. . . any . . . person the Secretary or his delegate may deem proper, to appear
before the Secretary or his delegate . . . to give such testimony . . . as may be
§7604(b), read in conjunction with §7602,
relevant . . . ." (Emphasis added.)
does not empower the district judge to order the testimony in court: when a summoned witness refuses to testify, "the Secretary or his delegate may apply to the
judge of the district court . . . for an attachment against him as for a contempt.
. . . [After "satisfactory proof" and a hearing] the judge . . . shall have the
power to make such order as he shall deem proper, not inconsistent with the law for the
punishment of contempts, to enforce obedience to the requirements of the vummons
(Emphasis added.) If
and to punish such person for his default or disobedience."
the trial judge in the second hearing of the instant case below did not have the power
to require the defendant to answer the ultimate question, but was confined to allowing
defendant to purge himself of his previous contempt, the judgment of contempt was
merely a confirmation of that previous contempt. On either theory, the issue before
the court of appeals would be the same. The questions of privilege as a defense to
the court's demand and privilege in the related IRS proceeding are so closely related
that one cannot reasonably be decided without reference to and decision of the other.

19 Instant case at 628.
2

0 E.g., United States v. Pape, 144 F.2d 778 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 752
(1944) (federal criminal case); Ex parte Sparrow, 14 F.R.D. 351 (N.D. Ala. 1953)
(proceeding to compel deposition under FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a)) ; Munzer v. Swedish
Am. Line, 35 F. Supp. 493 (S.D.N.Y. 1940) (proceeding to set aside subpoena under
FED. R. Civ. P. 45(d) (1)).
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itself,21 as to such matters as forms of pleadings, 22 time limits for motions,
and "satisfactory proof" of the need to compel testimony,23 the decisive
issue to which the court should have directed its attention was whether or
not the defendant was privileged to refrain from identifying his clients in
the tax investigation.24 Federal law has been held to govern this issue.25
In deciding the content of this federal law-the precise scope of the asserted privilege-the court had the power to choose between adopting state
law in the area and forging a federal common-law rule to be applied uniformly in all similar proceedings. 26 Important factors to be weighed in
making such a choice are the inhibition which such a privilege would place
upon effecting the congressional purpose in giving the IRS broad investigatory powers 2 7 and the countervailing problem of the impact of denying
privilege in an administrative proceeding on attempting to protect it in a
subsequent judicial action, s to which is related the danger of undermining
29
state privilege.
An adoption of state privilege law to govern IRS investigations
might well give rise to evasive "forum shopping" by taxpayers such as those
in the present case who, wishing to conceal their identities, could specially
consult lawyers in states whose law would protect them in the event of
investigations-perhaps in direct conflict with the purpose of the internal
revenue law. 30 The rationale of the Lee Hospital dictum, that those priv21

Fa. I. Civ. P. 81(a) (3).

22

See Martin v. Chandis Sec. Co., 128 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1942).
INT. REV. CODE or 1954, § 7604(b).

23 See
24

See Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734, 742 (5th Cir. 1953).

25 Id.

(by implication); cf. In re Albert Lindley Lee Memorial Hospital, 209
F.2d 122, 123 (2d Cir. 1953).
26

See Mishldn, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence and Discretion

in the Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 797,
798-801 (1957). See generally id. passim.
27 See Mishkin, supra note 26, at 805-06.
28
See generally 67 HAv. L. REv. 1272 (1954).
29 See Weinstein, Recognition in the United States of the Privileges of Another
Jurisdiction, 56 COLUm. L. REv. 535, 548 (1956).
30 That would frequently be the result if the state law selected were consistently
that of the forum: since the action to compel testimony must be brought in "the
district in which such person resides or may be found," INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§ 7402, the question of whether to compel an attorney to testify before the IRS would
usually arise before a district court sitting in the lawyer's home state; a prospective
anonymous taxpayer would only have to find an attorney in a congenial jurisdiction
in order to be protected. Since, however, state law does not govern the privilege
issue of its own force, but is incorporated into the federal law by choice of the court,

there is no compulsion for the court to choose the law of its state-it may choose
any state law which has some rational connection to the transactions at issue. See
Mishkin, supra note 26, at 806. The court might choose state law and yet, without
achieving uniformity, fix any taxpayer's privilege to communicate with his attorney
in such a way as to make "forum shopping" impossible; for example, the law of the
taxpayer's domicile might be selected. The choice, however, seems strained. (Further,
in a case like the present one, bow is the court going to discover the taxpayer's
domicile?) More interested in the communications between a lawyer and his client
are the states in which the communication takes place and where the lawyer is
admitted to practice. Thus, insofar as the court feels bound to prevent forum shopping,
it can better fashion its own law of privilege than take up state law on the subject.
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ileges should be recognized in an administrative proceeding which would
conform to and not derogate from privileges allowed in subsequent judicial
proceedings related to the inquiry, might be a strong counterargument for
adopting state law if such actions always arise in state courts or in civil
actions in federal district courts of the same state. Actually, there is considerable uncertainty as to which court will become the forum of any subsequent action, with consequent uncertainty as to what will be the applicable
law of privilege.31 In order to preserve privilege, then, a court would have
to choose the law of the most restrictive forum into which the subject matter of the litigation might find its way. Such a result would subvert the
broad powers of inquiry which Congress has vested in the IRS. Finally,
any direct effect upon state privilege of an IRS inquiry like that in the
instant case is likely to be slight. The attorney-client consultation in this
case was entirely concerned with federal taxation, and the investigation was
likewise limited to tax matters.32 The denial of a privilege in this matter
would have little of the inhibitory effect on frank and honest consultation
about general legal matters which gives rise to state attorney-client privileges. 3 On balance, the desirability of a uniform privilege rule for tax
any deference of federal courts
investigations would appear to outweigh
34
to state law and policy in this area.

RESTRAINT
AGREEMENT

OF

TRADE-MuFAcTuRFEs'

SUSTANED

TNDER

BRITIS

PRicE.FIXU G

RESTRICTIVE

TRADE,

PRACTICES ACT, 1956

Forty-four members of a manufacturers' trade association producing
ninety per cent of Britain's black bolts and nuts fixed common prices for
their products. Their agreement, registered pursuant to the Restrictive
31 See 67 HARv. L. REv. 1272, 1273 (1954) : "For example, a proceeding in the
Tax Court would be governed by the District of Columbia law of evidence, which
recognizes a doctor-patient privilege . . . whereas in a criminal prosecution for
fraudulent returns, the district court would apply a federal common law of privilege,
and probably would not protect the relationship."
32
Another complexity of the instant case results from the fact that defendantattorney never dealt with his "clients," but only with the clients' attorney and
accountants. Although it is arguable that state privilege might be threatened by a
refusal to protect, in an entirely federal context, the relationship of a client and his
"family lawyer," the dealings of that lawyer with a tax specialist for purposes of
maldng an anonymous deficiency payment seem expressly designed to thwart the IRS,
and are of questionable social value. Cf. Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and
Confusion: Privileges in Federal Court Today, 31 Tnt. L. Rxv. 101, 109-15 (1956).
S3 See Louisell, supra note 32, at 109-15.
34 Cf. Mishkin,

mipra note 26, at 813-14.
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Trade Practices Act of 1956,1 was referred by the Registrar 2 to the
Restrictive Practices Court, 3 a tribunal empowered to nullify and enjoin
adherence to any trade restrictions it finds contrary to the public interest. 4
Under the act, a restrictive agreement is deemed contrary to the public
interest unless the court is satisfied that it meets any of seven enumerated
justifications and, further, that it is not "unreasonable," a determination to
be made by balancing against its proven justifications any detriment to the
public that may result from its operation. 5 In justification of the Black
Bolt and Nut Association's agreement the court found that the resulting
common price structure eliminated any need for commercial purchasers
to "go shopping" for favorable prices. Since shopping adds to a purchaser's cost of doing business, its obviation, concluded the court, produces
a saving which is-in the language of one of the statutory justificationsa "specific and substantial benefit" to the public.6 On balance, because the
court believed that the established prices would not be higher than those
which free competition would determine, 7 the agreement was held not to be
"contrary to the public interest." In re Black Bolt & Nut Ass'n's Agree-

ment, L.R. 2 R.P. 50 (1960).
14 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 68, §§ 6 (specification of agreements subject to the act), 7-8
(agreements exempted, e.g., certain restrictions concerning foreign commerce), 9-10
(registration requirement). For an authoritative explication of the statutory scheme
see AiLBnay & FLETcHER-CooKE, MONOPOLIES AND REsncrIV TRADE PRAcncEs
(1956). See also Rhinelander, The British Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 46 VA.
L. REv. 1 (1960); Stevens, Experience and Experiment in the Legal Control of
Competition in the United Kingdom, 70 YALE L.J. 867 (1961). The exceptions to
the registration requirement are discussed in AixERY & FLETcHER-CooKE, op. cit supra
at 19-31.
2 The Registrar is an official "charged with the duty of preparing, compiling and
maintaining a register of agreements which are subject to registration . . . and of
taking proceedings before the Court .

.

.

."

4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 68, § 1(2).

3 The Restrictive Practices Court, established to carry out the 1956 act, is composed of five judges and not more than ten lay members "qualified by virtue of .

knowledge of or experience in industry, commerce or public affairs."
2, c. 68, § 4(1).

4 & 5 Eliz.

See Proceedings,International Conference on Control of Restrictive

Business Practices 12-13 (1960), for a brief account of the preenactment controversy
over the composition of the court and the allocation of power.
44 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 68, §20(3).
5 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 68, §21(1).
0The particular justification relied on requires the court to be satisfied "that

the removal of the restriction would deny to the public as purchasers, consumers or

users of any goods . . . specific and substantial benefits or advantages enjoyed or
likely to be enjoyed by them as such, whether by virtue of the restriction itself or
of any arrangements or operations resulting therefrom . . . ." 4 & 5 Eliz. 2,

c. 68, §21(1)(b). The court, compelled for the first time to interpret the clause
"to the public as purchasers, consumers or users," held that § 21(1) (b) could be
satisfied by a showing that the public in any one of these capacities would be denied
a specific and substantial benefit if the restriction were removed. Furthermore, the
court held that commercial purchasers, even though intermediate in the distributive
chain, are purchasers within the meaning of the act Compare AIB..RY & FLETcn RCooKE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 45. It was also noted that if commercial purchasers'
costs were to rise, higher prices to the ultimate consumers necessarily would result,
since the overall level of manufacturers' prices would not respond to free competition
in the industry. In re Black Bolt & Nut Ass'n's Agreement, L.R. 2 R.P. 50, 89-90
(1960).

But cf. note 27 infra. Inasmuch as the court included commercial pur-

chasers in the "public as purchasers" and a specific and substantial benefit to them
satisfied the statute, its finding that removing the agreement would raise prices to
the consuming public was unnecessary to its result.
7In re Black Bolt & Nut Ass'n's Agreement, supra note 6, at 89.
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Until 1948 Britain had no legislation dealing with restrictive trade
practices. The Monopolies and Restrictive Practices (Inquiry and Control) Act,8 passed in that year, authorized investigation into the pervasiveness and effect of restrictive practices in the British economy. A Monopolies Commission was given broad discretion to consider "all matters which
appear in the particular circumstances to be relevant" in determining
whether particular agreements operated to the detriment of the public.9
The 1948 act, reflecting a traditional British hesistancy to condemn restrictive agreements without regard to their effect,' 0 produced different conclusions as to similar restrictions, because the Commission rested its decisions largely on the actual operations of the agreements in their industrial
contexts." In addition, the sanctions provided by the 1948 act were
ineffective. 12 The Restrictive Trade Practices Act of 1956 13 was Britain's
first effective statutory scheme for controlling such practices. By declaring
restrictive agreements presumptively contrary to the public interest and by
limiting the permissible justifications, the 1956 act seemed to herald a less
lenient, more doctrinaire attitude toward restrictive trade practices than its
8 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 66.
9 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 66, § 14. "Public interest" was defined in the act, but only
in very general terms: "[R]egard shall be had to the need, consistently with the
general economic position of the United Kingdom, to achieve-(a) the production,
treatment and distribution by the most efficient and economical means of goods of
such types and qualities, in such volume and at such prices as will best meet the
requirements of home and overseas markets; (b) the organisation of industry and
trade in such a way that their efficiency is progressively increased and new enterprise
is encouraged; (c) the fullest use and best distribution of men, materials and industrial
capacity in the United Kingdom; and (d) the development of technical improvements
and the expansion of existing markets and the opening up of new markets." Ibid.
10 To date only one restrictive practice, collective resale price maintenance, has
been made illegal per se. 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 68, §§ 24-25. On the British attitude
toward restrictive trade practices generally, see Cairns, Monopolies and Restrictive
Practices, in LAW AND OPINION IN ENGLAND IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 173
(Ginsberg ed. 1959); Rostow, British and American Experience with Legislation
Against Restraint of Competition, 23 MODERN L. REv. 477 (1960).
"'Compare MONOPOLIES COMMISSION, REPORT ON THE SUPPLY OF INSULATED
ELECTRIC WIRE AND CABLES Iii 283, 287 (1952), approving price agreements as to
150, 290, recommending termination
rubber cable and covered conductors, with id. 1111
of price fixing as to miscellaneous telephone cables and cords.
12 Recommendations of the Monopolies Commission could be implemented in
only two ways. The first was by a statutory order (which requires the approval of
both houses of Parliament) prohibiting the restriction in question. Only one such
order was issued: The Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Order, 1 STAT. INSTR.,
1951, No. 1200, made it unlawful for two or more dental goods suppliers to agree
to withhold supplies from dealers, where this might limit the number of dealers or
maintain resale prices. Rhinelander, supra note 1, at 7. The second method provided
was for the ministry in charge of the industry involved to seek voluntary cooperation
of the industry in carrying out the Commission's recommendations. This procedure,
while used more frequently, depended on the acquiescence of the parties to the agreement. Referring to recommendations made by the Monopolies Commission concerning
the calico printing industry, which had been depressed for a considerable time, 171
ECONOMIST 303, 304 (1954), noted that the industry had "never taken kindly to
lectures from London on how to perish in a decently competitive posture." See
Grunfeld & Yarney, United Kingdom, in ANTI-TRUST LAWS 340, 384-87 (Friedmann
ed. 1956), for an account of enforcement under the 1948 act.
13 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 68.
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statutory predecessor.'
However, it was recognized that the omission of
any legislative definition of "public interest" and the possibility of broadly
construing the justification clauses enabled the Restrictive Practices Court
to determine how severe in its application the 1956 act would be.' 5 To
date, that court has shown no inclination to condone anticompetitive agreements: out of eight fully adjudicated cases prior to the present case, 16 in
only one has a restrictive agreement been found in its main respects consistent with the public interest. 17 In particular, the court has been con8
sistently hostile to price-fixing arrangements.'
The court justified the common price scheme in the present case on the
ground that it "saved" purchasers expensive shopping around.' 9 This
protection of buyers from an assumed indulgence in uneconomic price
comparisons fails to reflect several factors which encouraged the court to
uphold the agreement. The court was noticeably impressed by technical
cooperation and intertrading 2 0 among members of the industry, which
14 "The new Act lists seven tests and allows no other considerations in favour
of the agreements. This argues, superficially, that the new Act is less lenient to
restrictive agreements. . . . [T]he [Monopolies] Commission has on occasion refrained from recommending that an agreement be terminated apparently not because
of its positive merits but because of the absence of positive demerits; under the new
Act, however, an agreement can be allowed to continue only if the court is satisfied
that one or other of the listed advantages is present." Grunfeld & Yaney, Restrictive
Trade Practices Act, 1956, 1956 PuB. L. 319-20.
15Ibid. A determination as to public interest is required in every case in which
the respondent satisfies one of the justification clauses. The balancing procedure
for deciding whether the public interest is being harmed requires a formulation of
some sort of economic theory. This is true because the conclusion that a restrictive
agreement is detrimental to the public interest is only a prediction that absent the
agreement, according to some economic theory, a preferable result would occur.
See id. at 317-20.
' 6 In re Phenol Producers' Agreement, L.R. 2 R.P. 1 (1960); it re Fed'n of
British Carpet Mfrs.' Agreement, L.R. 1 R.P. 472 (1959); In re Fed'n of Wholesale
& Multiple Bakers' (Great Britain & No. Ireland) Agreement, L.R. 1 RP. 387
(1959) ; In re Wholesale & Retail Bakers of Scotland Ass'n's Agreement, L.R. 1 R.P.
347 (1959); In re Water-Tube Boilermakers' Agreement, L.R. 1 R.P. 285 (1959);
In re Blanket Mfrs.' Agreement, L.R. 1 R.P. 208 (1959), appeal dismissed, L.R. 1
R.P. 271 (C.A. 1959) ; In re Yarn Spinners' Agreement, L.R. 1 R.P. 118 (1959);
In re Chemists' Fed'n Agreement, L.R. 1 R.P. 75 (1958).
17 In re Water-Tube Boilermakers' Agreement, supra note 16, 108 U. PA. L. Rxv.
924 (1960). See also In re Blanket Mfrs.' Agreement, supra note 16, where an
insignificant part of an agreement was approved.
18 See In re Phenol Producers' Agreement, L.R. 2 R.P. 1 (1960) ; In re Fed'n
of British Carpet Mfrs.' Agreement, L.R. 1 R.P. 472 (1959) ; In re Fed'n of Wholesale & Multiple Bakers' (Great Britain & No. Ireland) Agreement, L.R. 1 R.P.
387 (1959) ; itre Wholesale & Retail Bakers of Scotland Ass'n's Agreement, L.R. 1
R.P. 347 (1959); In re Yarn Spinners' Agreement, L.R. 1 R.P. 118 (1959) ; Stevens,
supra note 1, at 885. But see In re Cement Makers' Fed'n Agreement, [1961] 1
Weekly L.R. 581, in which the Restrictive Practices Court, subsequent to the instant
case, upheld a price-fixing scheme on the grounds that by giving greater security to
investors, who were therefore willing to receive a smaller return (under 10% in the
industry as a whole) than they would demand under the insecure circumstances of
price competition (15%), the fixed prices were able to be lower than free competition
would afford, and that lower prices were a specific and substantial benefit to the
public as purchasers.
'9 Instant case at 89-90.
20 Since no manufacturer produces all sizes and types of fasteners, the members

intertrade at a set industry discount in order to fill their customer's orders.

"The
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foster what the court thought to be desirable specialization and small firm
protection.2 ' The court realized, however, that it was confined by an act
whose language does not exempt an agreement from condemnation because
of industrial efficiency, reasonable prices, small firm survival, or economic
specialization. 22 Faced with what it considered a reasonable restriction
without specific statutory justification, the court seems to have turned to
a supposed benefit-the shopping economy 2 3 - to qualify the agreement as
one yielding a "specific and substantial benefit," thereby avoiding the
impact of the statutory presumption.2 4 In the final balance, to mollify the
suggestion that the restriction injures the public by maintaining artificially
high prices,2 5 the court concluded that prices-thought reasonable in light
of the industry's efficiency and level of profits 2 6 -would not be driven down
27
significantly were the agreement voided.
general pattern of intertrading is between the larger and the smaller manufacturers,
arising from their respective capabilities for producing large quantities of standard
sizes in wide demand and lesser quantities of standard sizes for which the demand is
relatively small or of 'off standard specials' or 'out and out specials." Instant case
at 58.
21 "The inter-trading provisions . . . we think, probably resulted in keeping

.some of the small manufacturers in business, and . . . [avoided] some plant
duplication . . . ." Instant case at 97. "[flt is probable that the volume of intertrading would diminish if the restrictions were abolished .

.

.

."

Id. at 88.

Com-

pare in re Yarn Spinners' Agreement, L.R. 1 R.P. 118 (1959), where the court
disapproved a minimum price agreement, concluding that the industry should be made
smaller and that artificial price maintenance merely impeded this process.
22
The only justification which could possibly encompass these attributes would
be the "specific and substantial benefit" clause, but the court conceded that these
"benefits" were too speculative to satisfy that clause's requirements. Instant case
at 96-97.
23 The shopping economy is probably imaginary in that it assumes that purchasers will undertake an uneconomic operation. It seems obvious that if it costs
more to go shopping than can be realized by savings on lower prices, most purchasers
will forego shopping, each relying on one manufacturer who will keep his prices
competitive in order not to lose the business. 77 L.Q. REv. 28, 29 (1961). The court
recognized this weakness in its argument, but countered that in times of high demand
manufacturers-all of whom must rely on intertrading to fill comprehensive orderswould be unwilling to fill intertrade orders until their own established customers
were adequately provided. This would force purchasers to shop around in such times
because their usual sole suppliers would be unable to fill all their requirements. This
argument, however, overlooks the likelihood of purchasers establishing trade relations
with enough manufacturers to cover their entire potential needs.
24 A British commentator has questioned whether the obviation of shopping is
a specific and substantial benefit to the public: the association's agreement saves not
"'expense' but 'trouble'; and one of the reasons for the Restrictive Trade Practices
Act was the tendency of some British industries to save trouble at the cost of
efficiency." 77 L.Q. REv. 28, 29 (1961).
25
The Registrar never argued that prices in general were too high. He stressed
the spread of profits between different manufacturers-recently as much as 25 percentage points. "It follows that some members must be making larger profits and
some losses, and that the current price list really is out of balance in respect of a
considerable number of products." Instant case at 72. The court did not deal with
this issue, but concentrated on industry profits as a whole. See also instant case at 102.
26 Instant case at 99, 101-02.
27 Instant case at 99. But see 77 L.Q. Rlv. 28, 29 (1961): "[T]he principal
effect of the termination of the agreement would seem to be to transfer to purchasers
administrative costs previously absorbed by the manufacturers-which should be
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The court's reasoning that prices would not be appreciably lower
without the price-fixing agreement, especially in an industry displaying a
wide range of individual firm profitsna implicitly rejects the classical
economic theory that the lowest possible price will result from firms of
differing efficiencies competing in price.29 Even more significant, however, was the court's use of the transparent shopping economy rationale
to fit into a statutory slot an agreement which it found generally unobjectionable.3 ° This manifests a disposition on the part of the court to perpetuate the 1948 act's approach of evaluating the reasonableness of each
restriction as the court believes it in fact operates. 31 The 1956 act's
presumption is thus disregarded even in instances where the new statute
would appear to have foreclosed judicial determination. By expanding
the "specific and substantial benefit" justification,32 the court has effectively
determined to enjoy the same discretion in evaluating agreements as did
the Monopolies Commission. 3 The exercise of such discretion could significantly alter the impact of the 1956 act upon restrictive practices.
reflected by a reduction in manufacturers' prices." Two other factors also appear
to have carried weight with the court: the absence of any witnesses complaining about
the level of prices and the testimony of several satisfied customers of the association,
who testified that the common price structure was a very advantageous arrangement.
Instant case at 94-96.
28 See note 25 supra.
2 9
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(1954).
30 Compare note 14 supra.
31
An additional manifestation of this empirical approach is the courts treatment
of the method used by the association in setting its prices, a method devoid of reliable
costing data and which the court described as "open to obvious objections in principle
and in detail." Instant case at 85. "But whatever the theoretical objections, the
practical result of the methods adopted has been a price list which is rational and
reasonable, resulting in a profit level . . . which cannot be regarded as in any way
excessive." Id. at 101.
32
It can be argued that the court has not expanded § 21(1) (b). This section
uses the language that removal of the restriction "would deny" benefits to the public,
whereas paras. (a), (c), and (d) use language to the effect that the restriction must be
"reasonably necessary" to certain ends. Whether the difference in wording indicates
a Parliamentary intent to have para. (b) offer a wider gateway than the other justification clauses is unclear. If this difference in language was a deliberate attempt to create
in (b) a wide gateway, then arguably the court has not "expanded" it. See AL.RY
& FLETCHER-CooKE, op. cit. upra note 1, at 45 for a discussion of the language
differences. See also Grunfeld & Yamey, supra note 14, at 319; Cairns, supra note 10,
at 189-90, for statements noting the particular susceptibility of § 21(1) (b) to expansion.
-33 Although "public interest!' is left undefined in the new act, it appears that
the Restrictive Practices Court may now be following the formulation provided by
Parliament for the Monopolies Commission. Compare the elements discussed in text
as actually leading the court to uphold the agreement with the Parliamentary definition
of public interest for purposes of the 1948 act set forth in note 9 supra.

